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EXAMINING THE LAUTENBERG
AMENDMENT IN THE CIVILIAN AND
MILITARY CONTEXTS:
CONGRESSIONAL
OVERREACHING, STATUTORY VAGUENESS,
EX POST FACTO VIOLATIONS, AND
IMPLEMENTATIONAL FLAWS
Jessica A. Golden*
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a court reducing a domestic violence felony to a misde-
meanor because the judge does not want to give a "noncriminal"'
male a felony conviction merely for attacking his wife.2 Imagine
further that as a result of this judicial reluctance, the court
sentences the defendant to serve his time only on weekends. The
defendant is then released. Subsequently, he goes home and at-
tacks his wife again. This time he attacks her with a gun. This time
he kills her. Now imagine this man is a police officer or soldier
who has sworn an oath to protect you, 3 or perhaps a next door
neighbor, or a stranger you pass on the street.
When Congress passed the Lautenberg Amendment4 to the Gun
Control Act of 1968 ("Lautenberg Amendment" or "the Amend-
* J.D., Fordham University School of Law, 2001; B.A., College of Letters and
Women's Studies, High Honors, Wesleyan University, 1998. I would very much like
to thank Ann Moynihan, Associate Clinical Professor at Fordham University School
of Law, for her invaluable assistance in the development and writing of this Com-
ment. I would also like to thank Mary Ann Forgey, Assistant Professor in the Ford-
ham University Graduate School of Social Services, for her aid, inspiration, and
support. Finally, I would like to thank the editorial board and staff of the Fordham
Urban Law Journal for their invaluable time and assistance.
1. 104 CONG. REC. S10378 (1996) [hereinafter Statement of Sen. Lautenberg]
(proposing to Congress the Lautenberg Amendment to the Gun Control Act on Sep-
tember 12, 1996), available at 1996 WL 517928.
2. Id. The Record also states that in thirty states it is only a misdemeanor to beat
one's wife or child. Id.
3. See generally Ashley G. Pressler, Note, Guns and Intimate Violence: A Consti-
tutional Analysis of the Lautenberg Amendment, 13 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT
705, 711 n.32, 712 n.39 (1999). Law enforcement officials are a primary resource for
abused women. Therefore, a woman cannot feel safe if those who are sworn to pro-
tect her are exempted from culpability for the same violent crimes from which she
suffers. Id. at 712.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2000).
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ment") in September 30, 1996, it was with the express purpose of
reducing scenarios like this one, of preventing that police officer,
soldier, neighbor, or stranger from committing gun-related domes-
tic violence.5
The Lautenberg Amendment states that:
it shall be unlawful for any person.., who has been convicted in
any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, to ship
or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or
affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive
any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or trans-
ported in interstate or foreign commerce. 6
Citing national domestic violence statistics including the percent-
age of domestic violence homicides involving firearms each year,7
5. The Lautenberg Amendment passed by a vote of ninety-seven to two in the
Senate. S. 1632, 104th Cong. (1996) (enacted). President Clinton signed the Amend-
ment into law four months later as part of the 1997 Consolidated Omnibus Appropri-
ations Act, Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-3172 (1999).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). A "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" is de-
fined as a crime constituting a misdemeanor under federal or state law that:
has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or the
threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by a current or former
spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the victim
shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabitating with or has
cohabitated with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a person
similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim.
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(i)-(ii) (2000). A person is considered "convicted" of the
misdemeanor offense if:
the person was represented by counsel in the case, or knowingly and intelli-
gently waived the right to counsel in the case; and ... [where applicable,] the
case was tried by a jury, or ... the person knowingly and intelligently waived
the right to have the case tried by a jury, by guilty plea or otherwise .... A
person shall not be considered to have been convicted of such an offense...
if the conviction has been expunged or set aside, or is an offense for which a
person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored . . .unless the
pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that
the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.
8 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(i)-(ii) (2000).
7. A woman is beaten every fifteen seconds by her husband or boyfriend. 104
CONG. REC. S12341 (statement of Sen. Dodd quoting FBI crime statistics). See gener-
ally KAREN BROCK, MPH, VIOLENCE POLICY CTR., WHEN MEN MURDER WOMEN:
AN ANALYSIS OF 1997 HOMICIDE DATA 1 (1999), available at http://www.vpc.org
(stating that fifty-two percent of female homicides were committed with firearms in
1997); NANCY A. CROWELL & ANN. W. BURGESS, UNDERSTANDING VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 26 (1996); James Bovard, Disarming Those Who Need Guns Most,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 1996, at A12 (stating that an estimated 100,000 to 150,000
Americans are convicted of domestic violence each year). This is a higher percentage
than homicides committed with all other weapons combined. Seventy-seven percent
of firearm homicides were committed with handguns. OFFICE OF WOMEN'S HEALTH
REPORT, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FACTS, http://www.bhpc.hrsa.gov/omwh/#3 (last vis-
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Senator Lautenberg intended to close a dangerous loophole in the
Gun Control Act enabling domestic violence offenders to evade an
additional felony conviction for gun possession by getting domestic
violence felony charges reduced to misdemeanors.8 Senator
Lautenberg sought to secure the same protection for the family of
a domestic violence misdemeanant as was theoretically provided
the family of a domestic violence felon through existing law.9 The
Lautenberg Amendment, therefore, subjects domestic violence
misdemeanants to the same restrictions1 ° faced by prior convicted
felons, making it a felony for domestic violence misdemeanants to
ship, transport, or possess a weapon in or affecting interstate
commerce.
11
However, while the Lautenberg Amendment mirrors the Gun
Control Act in making gun possession a felony, its scope is
broader. The Lautenberg Amendment precludes the Gun Control
Act's public interest exception 12 exempting governmental agencies
ited Apr. 18, 2001) (stating that firearms are frequently the "weapons leading to mor-
tality rates of women killed by their spouses, boyfriends or others").
8. Statement of Sen. Lautenberg, supra note 1.
9. Prior convicted felons cannot ship, transport or posses a weapon in or affecting
interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 921 (2000); Statement of Sen. Lautenberg, supra
note 1, at S10379. Senator Wellstone (D. Minn.) spoke in support of the Lautenberg
Amendment, emphasizing the need to correct the flawed state of the law prior to
Lautenberg that imposed a harsher sentence on a defendant who committed a crime
of violence against a stranger, than on a defendant who committed that same crime
against a family member: "If you beat up or batter your neighbor's wife, it's a felony.
If you beat up or batter or brutalize your own wife or your child, it is a misdemeanor."
Id. See generally id. (stating that two-thirds of domestic violence murders involve fire-
arms, and that a gun is present in 150,000 cases of abuse). Senator Lautenberg
claimed that "all too often, the only difference between a battered woman and a dead
woman is the presence of a gun." Id. at S10378.
10. The maximum statutory sentence for possessing a firearm after being con-
victed of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence is ten years. This sentence may
accompany a fine of up to $250,000. 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(9), 924 (a)(2) (1994).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 921 (2000). As discussed later in this Comment, no law suits have
successfully challenged the constitutionality of the Lautenberg Amendment through a
commerce clause argument, but the matter is still hotly debated.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 925 (a)(1) (1968) (amended 1997). The exception exempted "any
firearm or ammunition imported for, sold or shipped to, or issued for the use of, the
United States or any department or agency thereof." Id. However, it is not entirely
clear if Senator Lautenberg intended to preclude this exception. The preclusion may
have been introduced by opponents of the bill in the effort to weaken the legislation
prior to the vote in Congress. Alison J. Nathan, Note, At the Intersection of Domestic
Violence and Guns: The Public Interest Exception and the Lautenberg Amendment, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 822, 838 (2000); David Pace, ASSOCIATED PRESS POL. SERV.
(1997), 1997 WL 2492802 (stating that "Lautenberg charged . . . that Republicans
acted 'in the dark of the night' during negotiations last fall to remove the exemption
so the new law would contain a 'poison pill' that would generate public opposition
and give them a chance to later repeal it.").
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from the Gun Control Act.13 Therefore, the Amendment applies
to, and has great potential to impact both police and the military. 4
With the Lautenberg Amendment, Congress rightly prioritized
the need to reduce gun-related domestic violence nationwide.
However, while this underlying idea is fundamental to domestic
safety, the Lautenberg Amendment is possibly unconstitutional. 5
Congress may have impermissibly abused its Commerce Clause
authority in passing the Lautenberg Amendment.'6 This conclu-
sion is supported by the United States Supreme Court's recent de-
13. Such governmental agencies include the military and the state police. Captain
E. John Gregory, The Lautenberg Amendment: Gun Control in the U.S. Army, 2000
ARMY LAW. 3, 3 (2000). Police and the military have traditionally been exempt from
federal gun control laws due to the need to foster public safety. Id. The Lautenberg
Amendment is the first to preclude such an exception.
14. As discussed later in this Comment, many challenges to the constitutionality of
the Lautenberg Amendment have come from police or military personnel who be-
lieve that the Amendment was passed directly to affect their jobs and that the
Amendment disproportionately affects their job security. Jonathan Kerr, Critics Say
Anti-Domestic Violence Amendment Takes Shot at Police, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, (Dec.
2. 1996), 1996 WL 684742; see also LA Cops Challenge New Domestic-Abuse Gun
Ban, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, (Jan. 2, 1997), 1997 WL 706.
15. The primary challenges to the Amendment have been on grounds of violating
the Commerce Clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8; the Ex Post Facto Clause, U.S. CoNsT.
art.l, § 10; and the Fifth, Tenth, and Second Amendments, U.S. CONST. amend. II, V,
IX. The applicable portion of the Fifth Amendment, passed in 1791, states that "no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.
CONST. amend V. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment im-
pliedly present in the Fifth Amendment also applies to this analysis. U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV. The Tenth Amendment, passed in 1791, states that "[t]he powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the People." U.S. CONST. amend. X. The
Second Amendment, passed in 1791, states "[a] well regulated Militia, being neces-
sary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,
shall not be infringed." U.S. CONST. amend. II. This comment will not discuss a Sec-
ond Amendment challenge, however, because "[i]t is well established that the Second
Amendment does not create an individual right . . . [but] 'preserves a collective,
rather than individual, right."' United States v. Napier, 233 F.3d 394, 403 (6th Cir.
2000) (citing Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1995)). The Napier court
further stated that "[e]very circuit court which has had occasion to address the issue
has upheld § 922 generally against challenges under the Second Amendment." Id.
(citing United States v. Chavez, 204 F.3d 1305, 1313 N.5 (11th Cir. 2000)); United
States v. Waller, 218 F.3d 856, 857 (8th Cir. 2000); Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis,
185 F.3d 693, 709 (7th Cir. 1999); Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 173 F.3d
898, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1999); United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 624 (8th Cir. 1999);
United States v. Mack, 164 F.3d 467, 473 (9th Cir. 1999). All constitutional challenges
under the Ex Post Facto Clause and the Fifth, Tenth, and Second Amendments have
thus far failed.
16. Under Article 1, § 8 of the United States Constitution, Congress has the au-
thority to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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cision in United States v. Morrison,7 where the Court struck down
the civil remedies provision of the Violence Against Women Act18
due to an impermissible overstepping by Congress under the Com-
merce Clause. 19 In light of Morrison, a rebirth of suits challenging
the constitutionality of the Lautenberg Amendment could occur.
Due to the definitional vagueness of the terms in the Lautenberg
Amendment, the statute may also violate the Due Process Clause
of the Constitution.20  Further, in the military setting, the
Lautenberg Amendment possibly constitutes an impermissible ex
post facto law because of its solely punitive effects.21 Even if the
Lautenberg Amendment is constitutional, the Amendment's defi-
nitional vagueness and inherent structural and implementational
flaws render it ineffective.22
Part I of this Comment examines the Commerce Clause (and
Tenth Amendment) challenges23 to the Lautenberg Amendment.
It provides the history of cases thus far failing to successfully chal-
lenge the constitutionality of the Lautenberg Amendment. It then
discusses the Supreme Court's decision in Morrison, that struck
down the civil remedies provision of the Violence Against Women
Act ("VAWA" or "VAWA provision") as a violation of the Com-
merce Clause. 24  Applying the Morrison rationale to the
Lautenberg Amendment, this Comment concludes that Congress
may have violated its Commerce Clause authority by passing the
Lautenberg Amendment.
Part II examines the Due Process Clause challenge to the
Lautenberg Amendment, discussing case law representing both
17. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
18. Violance Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000).
19. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (rejecting Congress's rationale for the civil reme-
dies provision because violence against women lacked the necessary nexus to inter-
state commerce, which if accepted "would allow Congress to regulate any crime as
long as the nationwide, aggregated impact has substantial effects on employment, pro-
duction, transit, or consumption"). Infra Part IB.
20. Infra Part II.
21. An ex post facto law makes illegal an action that was legal when taken. Calder
v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798). Ex post facto laws violate the Constitution. Id. For a
definition of "ex post facto" law, see Part III of this comment. For a discussion of the
Lautenberg Amendment as an ex post facto law in the military context, see infra Part
(III)(B).
22. Infra Part V.
23. In this section, the Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment challenges are
discussed together because if a court finds Congress acted within its powers under the
Commerce Clause then the action taken by Congress necessarily does not violate
states' rights under the Tenth Amendment. United States v. Wright, 128 F.3d 1274,
1276 (8th Cir. 1997); see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992).
24. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000).
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sides of the issue. Although courts have upheld the constitutional-
ity of the Lautenberg Amendment under the Due Process Clause,
the Lautenberg Amendment could be characterized as unconstitu-
tionally vague. Further, as Judge Posner noted in his dissent in
United States v. Wilson, it may be unjust to convict someone of a
crime when that person had no knowledge his actions were wrong-
ful. If this is true, the Lautenberg Amendment violates the Due
Process Clause.
Part III of this Comment analyzes the Ex Post Facto Clause chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of the Lautenberg Amendment. It
examines this challenge in both the civilian and military settings
and concludes that while the Lautenberg Amendment may not be
characterized as an impermissible ex post facto law in the civilian
context, it could be so construed in the military context. Therefore,
this Part argues that the Lautenberg Amendment should be
amended to except the military from its reach.
Part IV provides the history of cases raising an Equal Protection
Clause challenge to the Lautenberg Amendment - cases which
have thus far failed. Part V examines further weaknesses with re-
spect to the Amendment's implementation and enforcement. This
part argues that flaws inherent in the Amendment's language
render the Lautenberg Amendment incapable of reducing nation-
wide gun-related domestic violence in either civilian or military
settings.
This Comment concludes that to successfully reduce domestic vi-
olence incidents involving firearms, Congress needs to reexamine
and rework the Lautenberg Amendment. Even if the Lautenberg
Amendment is constitutional, Congress needs to provide further
guidance in how the Amendment should be implemented. In addi-
tion, Congress must increase public awareness of the Amendment
for it to be effective. If Congress does not take these steps, the
Lautenberg Amendment will fail to achieve its intended goals.
I. COMMERCE CLAUSE (AND TENTH AMENDMENT)
CHALLENGES TO THE LAUTENBERG AMENDMENT
Under Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Consti-
tution, Congress has the authority to "regulate Commerce with for-
eign Nations, and among the several States."25 In 1995, in United
States v. Lopez, the Supreme Court elaborated on the power of
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c.3 .
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Congress under the Commerce Clause.26 The Lopez Court identi-
fied three categories of activity Congress can permissibly regulate
under its commerce power:
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate
commerce .... Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and
protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons
or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may
come only from intrastate activities .... Finally, Congress' com-
merce authority includes the power to regulate those activities
having a substantial relation to interstate commerce. 7
In Lopez, the Court struck down the Gun-Free School Zones
Act (the "Act"), 28 finding the Act an impermissible overextension
of Congress's Commerce Clause authority.29 First, the Court con-
cluded the Act was a "criminal statute that. . . has nothing to do
with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however
broadly one might define those terms. ' 30 Thus, the "noneconomic,
criminal nature" of possessing guns in school zones was key to the
Supreme Court's decision to strike the Act down.3' Second, the
statute lacked the requisite "jurisdictional element '32 necessary to
connect possessing firearms in a school zone with interstate
commerce.
33
In Lopez, the Supreme Court rejected the government's attempt
to link gun-related violence in school zones with interstate com-
26. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
27. Id. at 558-59.
28. Id. at 567. The Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 made it a "federal offense
for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows,
or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone." 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2) (2000). See
also 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(25) (2000) (defining "school zone" under the statute); 18
U.S.C. § 922 (q)(1)(A) (describing the nationwide pervasive gun problem).
29. Id. at 561. The Lopez decision marks the first time the Supreme Court struck
down Commerce Clause legislation since 1936. Eric Andrew Pullen, Guns, Domestic
Violence, Interstate Commerce, and the Lautenberg Amendment: "Simply Because
Congress May Conclude that a Particular Activity Substantially Affects Interstate Com-
merce Does Not Necessarily Make it So," 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 1029, 1040 (1998).
30. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. The government unsuccessfully argued that gun pos-
session leads to violent crime and that violent crime effects the national economy in
two ways: (1) there are substantial costs of violent crime, which the population must
account for through insurance costs; and (2) violent crime reduces the willingness of
people to travel within specific areas perceived to be unsafe. Id. at 563-64. The gov-
ernment also unsuccessfully argued that allowing guns in a school zone would ad-
versely impact the educational process, thus producing a "less productive citizenry."
Id. at 564.
31. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000).
32. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62.
33. Id.
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merce. The Court found the government's "costs of crime" and
"national productivity" arguments would "permit Congress to 'reg-
ulate not only all violent crime, but all activities that might lead to
violent crime, regardless of how tenuously they relate to interstate
commerce." 34 To allow such arguments, the Court reasoned, would
eliminate any limitation on federal power under the Commerce
Clause.35 The Supreme Court thus struck down the Act, conclud-
ing that the Act's legislative history and congressional findings
were insufficient to demonstrate that possessing guns in a school
zone effected interstate commerce.36
A. Applying Lopez to The Lautenberg Amendment
In the context of the Lautenberg Amendment, the relevant por-
tion of the Commerce Clause, as in Lopez, relates to Congress's
authority to regulate activities having a "substantial relation" to in-
terstate commerce. 37 To prevail in a Commerce Clause challenge,
the government need only demonstrate a slight effect of a particu-
lar activity on interstate commerce.38 Therefore, a Lautenberg
Amendment convictions will be upheld where the government can
show the firearm possessed by a domestic violent misdemeanant at
the time of arrest was, at some point, in or affecting interstate
commerce.
39
Opponents of the Lautenberg Amendment have attempted to
use Lopez to prove that the Lautenberg Amendment violates the
Commerce Clause because there is no substantial relation between
firearms possessed by domestic violence misdemeanants and inter-
state commerce.40  So far, such challenges have been
unsuccessful. 4
In Gillespie v. Indianapolis,42 the Seventh Circuit distinguished
the Lautenberg Amendment from the Gun-Free School Zones Act
struck down in Lopez. The court held the Lautenberg Amendment
to be constitutional because, unlike the Gun Free School Zones
34. Id. at 564.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 567-68.
37. Id. at 559.
38. United States v. Farnsworth, 92 F.3d 1001, 1006 (10th Cir. 1996).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2000).
40. E.g., Nat'l Ass'n of Gov't Employees, Inc. v. Barrett, 968 F. Supp. 1564, 1572
(N.D. Ga. 1997), affd sub. nom Hiley v. Barrett, 155 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 1998); Fra-
ternal Order of Police v. United States, 981 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1997).
41. E.g., Barrett, 968 F. Supp. at 1572; Fraternal Order of Police, 981 F. Supp. at 4.
42. Gillespie v. Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 1999).
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Act, the Amendment contains a jurisdictional element requiring a
domestic violence misdemeanant to have a firearm "in or affecting
commerce."4 3 Given this requisite jurisdictional element, the court
ruled Congress did not violate the Commerce Clause in enacting
the Lautenberg Amendment.4
The Gillespie Court therefore concluded the defendant's Tenth
Amendment claim also failed because Congress had acted within
its Commerce Clause authority45 and the Lautenberg Amendment
"works no change upon state laws concerning domestic vio-
lence... [but] simply attaches a new federal consequence to a state
conviction with respect to the possession of firearms in or affecting
interstate commerce. '46 Similar Tenth Amendment challenges to
the Lautenberg Amendment have also failed.47
43. Id. at 704.
44. Id. A majority of Lautenberg cases discussing the Commerce Clause chal-
lenge have also reached this conclusion. Fraternal Order of Police v. United States,
173 F.3d 898, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1999); United States v. Smith, 101 F.3d 202, 215 (1st Cir.
1996); United States v. Gateward, 84 F.3d 670, 672 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v.
Wells, 98 F.3d 808, 810-11 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242
(5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Turner, 77 F.3d 887, 889 (6th Cir. 1996); United States
v. Lewis, 100 F.3d 49, 52 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Barry, 98 F.3d 373, 378 (8th
Cir. 1996); United States v. Nguyen, 88 F.3d 812, 820-821 (9th Cir. 1996); United
States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387, 390 n.4 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Sorrentino,
72 F.3d 294, 296 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396, 400 (10th Cir.
1995); United States v. Boyd, 52 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1236 (D. Kan. 1999), affd, 211 F.3d
1279 (10th Cir. 2000) (rejecting defendant's reliance on Lopez and concluding that the
jurisdictional element present in the Gun Control Act defeats the Commerce Clause
challenge).
In United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215 (1st Cir. 1999), the court further emphasized
this conclusion, stating, "It is true ... that courts regularly have upheld the use of a
case-by-case jurisdictional element . . . as a means of satisfying the required nexus
with interstate commerce, and, thus, bringing federal legislation within the shelter of
the Commerce Clause." Id. at 224; see also United States v. Joost, 133 F.3d 125, 131
(1st Cir. 1998); United States v. Pierson, 139 F.3d 501, 502-03 (5th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Cunningham, 161 F.3d 1343, 1345-47 (11th Cir. 1998).
45. Supra note 23; Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991); United States v.
Wright, 128 F.3d 1274, 1276 (8th Cir. 1997).
46. Gillespie, 185 F.3d at 706 n.7.
47. E.g., Fraternal Order of Police, 173 F.3d at 907. The Fraternal Order of Police
unsuccessfully argued that the Lautenberg Amendment "unconstitutionally restricts
states' power to determine police officers' 'qualifications for office,' ... by prohibiting
domestic violence misdemeanants from holding law enforcement positions requiring
the use of firearms." Id. This argument failed because the Fraternal Order court rea-
soned that the Supreme Court "no longer reads the Tenth Amendment as forbidding
such regulation, relegating to the political process the states' protection from undue
intrusion in this form." Id. (citing South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 511 (1988);
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-54 (1985)).
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B. Possible Rebirth of the Commerce Clause Challenge to the
Lautenberg Amendment Under Morrison
Although the Supreme Court limited Congress's Commerce
Clause authority in Lopez,48 subsequent cases have continued to
uphold the Lautenberg Amendment as a permissible use of Com-
merce Clause authority.49 However, in 2000, in United States v.
Morrison, ° the Supreme Court once again emphasized the limits
of Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause. In Morri-
son, the Court struck down the civil remedies provision of the Vio-
lence Against Women Act.5  This reemphasis on limiting
Congress's Commerce Clause authority may influence courts to re-
analyze the constitutionality of the Lautenberg Amendment.
48. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
49. Supra Part (I)(A). Again, courts have differentiated Lautenberg cases from
Lopez primarily by pointing to the jurisdictional language in the Amendment limiting
its scope to firearms "in or affecting interstate commerce." Supra note 44. Such juris-
dictional limitation was not present in the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. Lo-
pez, 514 U.S. at 561.
50. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598 (2000).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b) (1994) (providing a federal civil remedy for victims of
gender-motivated violence). The stated purpose of the provision was to "protect the
civil rights of victims of gender motivated violence and to promote public safety,
health, and activities affecting interstate commerce by establishing a federal civil
rights cause of action for victims of crimes of violence motivated by gender." 42
U.S.C. § 13981(a). Therefore,
[a] person (including a person who acts under color of any statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State) who commits a crime of
violence motivated by gender and thus deprives another of the right de-
clared in subsection (b) of this section shall be liable to the party injured, in
an action for the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive
and declaratory relief, and such other relief as a court may deem
appropriate.
42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994).
In defining the statutory provisions, the term "crime of violence motivated by gender"
is "a crime of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and
due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender." 42 U.S.C.
§ 13981(d)(1). The term "crime of violence" is defined as:
(A) an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony against the person
or that would constitute a felony against property if the conduct presents a
serious risk of physical injury to another, and that would come within the
meaning of State or Federal offenses described in section 16 of Title 18,
whether or not those acts have actually resulted in criminal charges, prosecu-
tion, or conviction ... and (B) includes an act or series of acts that would
constitute a felony described in subparagraph (A) but for the relationship
between the person who takes such action and the individual against whom
the action is taken.
42 U.S.C. § 13981(2)(A)-(B).
436
LAUTENBERG AMENDMENT
1. The Facts of Morrison
The Morrison case involved a college student, Christy
Brzonkala, who attended Virginia Polytechnic Institute ("VPI" or
the "University"), beginning in September 1994.52 During her first
semester, she met two members of the football team, Antonio
Morrison and James Crawford.53 Brzonkala alleged that within
thirty minutes of meeting her, the two men assaulted and repeat-
edly raped her.54 Brzonkala consequently suffered from severe
emotional trauma, stopped attending classes, and withdrew from
the University.55 In 1995, Brzonkala filed a complaint against Mor-
rison and Crawford under the Sexual Assault Policy of the Univer-
sity.56 The judicial committee found Morrison guilty of sexual
assault, but lacked sufficient evidence to punish Crawford.57
In July, 1995, Morrison planned to appeal the conviction in a
court challenge of the school's sexual harassment policy.58 The
University then held a second hearing under its policy, which at the
time of the first hearing had not been widely disseminated to the
students.59 The judicial committee again found Morrison guilty,
and he again received a two month suspension from the Univer-
sity.60 At this second sentencing, however, Morrison was not found
guilty of "sexual assault," but only of "using abusive language. '61
Morrison again appealed, 62 and on August 21, 1995, the Univer-
sity set aside the conviction, finding it excessive in comparison to
prior cases prosecuted under the policy. 63 In December 1995,
Brzonkala sued Morrison, Crawford, and the University in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia.64
She alleged that the attack on her by Morrison and Crawford vio-
lated the Violence Against Women Act.65 Morrison and Crawford
moved to dismiss, arguing that the VAWA civil remedies provision
52. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 602-03.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 603.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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was unconstitutional. The United States intervened to argue that
the VAWA civil remedies provision was constitutional.66
The district court dismissed Brzonkala's case, finding that al-
though Brzonkala had successfully stated a claim against the de-
fendants under VAWA, Congress lacked the authority to enact
VAWA's civil remedy provision under the Commerce Clause or
Fourteenth Amendment.67 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the Lautenberg district court's con-
clusion that Congress lacked constitutional authority to enact the
VAWA provision, and reversed the district court's decision, recog-
nizing the validity of Brzonkala's VAWA claim.68 On a rehearing
en banc, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
vacated its earlier decision and reaffirmed the district court.69
Brzonkala appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.7 °
2. The Supreme Court's Reasoning in Morrison:
Reaffirming Lopez
As the Supreme Court stated in Lopez, to strike down congres-
sional legislation, there must be a plain showing that Congress ex-
ceeded its constitutional bounds. 71  A presumption of
constitutionality exists for Congressional legislation. 72 Neverthe-
less, Congress's regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause
is not unlimited.73
In challenging the VAWA provision's constitutionality, the de-
fendants in Morrison used Lopez to argue that Congress failed to
demonstrate the substantial jurisdictional tie between violent gen-
der-motivated crime and interstate commerce. 4 The Morrison
court agreed, finding that "gender-motivated crimes of violence are
not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity. '75 Therefore,
66. Id.
67. Id. at 604 (citing Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic and State Univ., 935 F. Supp.
779, 801 (W.D. Va. 1996)).
68. Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic and State Univ, 132 F.3d 949, 974 (4th Cir. 1997).
69. Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic and State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (en
banc).
70. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598.
71. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577-78 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring); United States v.
Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 635 (1883).
72. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577-78; United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 635 (1883).
73. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608.
74. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; supra note 30 (discussing the government's arguments
attempting to demonstrate the connection between gender motivated violence and
interstate commerce).
75. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607.
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though the Court was satisfied by the congressional findings show-
ing the serious impact of gender-motivated violence on victims,
such findings were not sufficient to "sustain the constitutionality
[of the VAWA provision as] Commerce Clause legislation. '76 The
Court concluded that in passing VAWA, Congress had not limited
itself to regulating economic activities. 77 Therefore, Congress over-
stepped its authority in enacting the VAWA civil remedies
78provision.
In Morrison, the Court thus reemphasized its conclusion in Lo-
pez that "[s]imply because Congress may conclude that a particular
activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessa-
rily make it so."'79 If the Court upheld the VAWA provision, Con-
gress could "regulate any crime as long as the nationwide,
aggregated impact of that crime has substantial effects on employ-
ment, production, transit, or consumption."8 The Court was
rightly not willing to accept this overbroad delineation of Congres-
sional authority under the Commerce Clause.
3. Applying Morrison in the Lautenberg Amendment Context
A notable case applying Morrison to the Lautenberg debate is
United States v. Bunnell.81 In Bunnell, the defendant used Morri-
son to argue, among other unsuccessful claims, that the Lautenberg
Amendment is an unconstitutional overreaching of Congressional
76. Id. at 608. The government unsuccessfully argued a "but-for" causation analy-
sis; gender-motivated violence affects interstate commerce
by deterring potential victims from traveling interstate, from engaging in em-
ployment in interstate business, and from transacting with business, and in
places involved in interstate commerce; ... by diminishing national produc-
tivity, increasing medical and other costs, and decreasing the supply of and
the demand for interstate products.
Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994)).
77. Id. at 607.
78. Id. at 610.
79. Id. at 608 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 n.2). The Court also feared a com-
plete "obliterat[ion of] the Constitution's distinction between national and local au-
thority" if it accepted the government's rationale for upholding VAWA. Id. (citing
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564). Further, the government's reasoning would allow Congress
to delve into other traditionally state-regulated areas, such as family law. Id. at 609.
This would open the floodgates to the justification of Congressional regulation in
many other areas of law as well. Id.
80. Id. at 608-09.
81. United States v. Bunnell, 106 F. Supp. 2d 60 (D. Me. 2000) (holding that Con-
gress did not abuse its Commerce Clause authority in creating the Lautenberg
Amendement, which prohibits a person subject to a domestic violence restraining or-
der from possessing a firearm).
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power under the Commerce Clause. 82 He argued that the Morri-
son decision extended Lopez, thus invalidating the statute.83
However, the Bunnell Court noted that in Morrison, the Su-
preme Court did not address the criminal penalties in VAWA, but
only the civil remedies provision.84 Therefore, the court held,
under Morrison, the "exten[sion] ' 85 of Lopez does not apply in a
criminal context.86 Looking to earlier Lautenberg Amendment
cases for guidance, the Bunnell court concluded the Lautenberg
Amendment has "both a specific jurisdictional element as well as a
substantial effect on interstate commerce" and therefore is a "con-
stitutional exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce
Clause.
87
As the Bunnell court recognized, courts have not, thus far, spe-
cifically addressed the "exten[sion]"88 of Lopez in the criminal con-
text.89 Although the Bunnell court found Morrison does not apply
in the criminal context, 90 this is only one decision from a district
court in Maine. Further, the court did not definitively conclude
Morrison could not apply in the criminal context, but only that the
Supreme Court, thus far, had only applied it in a civil context.91
Courts, therefore, should recognize Morrison as a restatement
by the Supreme Court of the limits on Congress's Commerce
Clause authority in both civil and criminal contexts. Courts should
use Morrison in the criminal context to find the Lautenberg
Amendment a violation of the Commerce Clause.
In a majority of Lautenberg Amendment cases, courts have con-
cluded the presence of the requisite jurisdictional nexus alone is
sufficient to overcome the Commerce Clause challenge. 92 In Lo-
pez, however, the Supreme Court pointed both to the absence of a
jurisdictional nexus and the non-economic nature of the regulated
activity as constitutional defects causing the Court to overturn the
statute.93 The Court did not suggest the presence of one of these
elements alone would satisfy Commerce Clause requirements.
82. Id. at 64.
83. Id. at 65.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See id.
92. Supra Part (I)(A).
93. 514 U.S. at 561, 559-68.
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Rather, in Morrison, the Supreme Court specifically stated the
presence of only one element, the data relating to the impact of
gender-motivated violence on victims, did not satisfy the Com-
merce Clause in the absence of the other element, the jurisdictional
nexus. 94 Based on Lopez and Morrison, courts cannot determine a
statute to be constitutional due to the presence of only one ele-
ment.9 5 In deciding if the Lautenberg Amendment is constitu-
tional, courts are incorrect in concluding the presence of the
jurisdictional nexus alone is sufficient to satisfy the Commerce
Clause.96
Furthermore, the de minimis requisite jurisdictional nexus pre-
sent in the Amendment perpetuates the overbroad Congressional
Commerce Clause authority the Supreme Court sought to limit in
both Lopez and Morrison. Merely adding the words "in or affect-
ing commerce" to a statute should not be sufficient to make the
statute constitutional under the Commerce Clause.97 If all that is
required is a de minimis showing of relation to interstate com-
merce based on possessing a firearm, there is nothing to prevent
Congress from also regulating the possession of other items other-
wise legally owned.98
Congress should not be permitted to use the Commerce Clause
as a catch-all provision to pass laws simply by including a de
minimis requirement in a statute. To ensure that the Commerce
Clause is "not without effective bounds," 99 courts nationwide
should recognize the impact of Morrison in the Lautenberg
Amendment context and the need to limit Congress's Commerce
Clause authority.
Congress should be required to demonstrate a more coherent,
viable nexus between the regulated activity and its affect on com-
merce before having the authority to implement national policy. A
mere de minimis showing is not adequate, especially given the Su-
94. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
95. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; id.
96. Although, in the Lautenberg context, given the breadth of statistics relating to
firearms and domestic violence, the presence of this element will not likely be
disputed.
97. As previously discussed, the Supreme Court in Lopez stated that "'[s]imply
because Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects inter-
state commerce does not necessarily make it so.'" Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 n.2 (citing
Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 311 (1981)).
98. United States v. Wilson, 159 F.3d 280, 294 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Ficke, 58 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1074 (D. Neb. 1999).
99. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608 (2000).
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preme Court's concerns about maintaining a distinction between
national and state regulatory authority. 100
Further, the jurisdictional nexus found in the Lautenberg
Amendment relates to whether the firearm itself was "in or af-
fect[ed] commerce." '' This element alone was not sufficient in
Lopez to uphold the constitutionality of the Gun-Free School
Zones Act,10 2 and should not be sufficient in the Lautenberg
Amendment context. To allow this rationale would perpetuate the
overbroad regulatory authority of Congress the Supreme Court
seeks to avoid."0 3
II. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE CHALLENGE
While several district court cases have found the Lautenberg
amendment violates due process requirements of notice and fair
warning 4 and have addressed the possible vagueness of the
Amendment's statutory terms,0 5 circuit courts nationwide have
upheld the constitutionality of the Lautenberg Amendment on due
process grounds.'0 6 Nevertheless, it is important to examine the
reasoning on both sides of the due process debate because the chal-
lenge is frequently raised.
A. Notice and Fair Warning Requirement
In April 1994, defendant Gerald Ficke, appearing pro se, plead
no contest to a misdemeanor charge of assaulting his wife. 107 Ficke
received six months probation and was ordered to complete anger
100. Id. at 1754; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68.
101. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2000).
102. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559 (discussing Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 n.27
(1968) where the Court emphasized its reservations about "Congress ...us[ing] a
relatively trivial impact on commerce as an excuse for broad general regulation of
state or private activities").
103. Id. Further, consider a case in which the government cannot prove that a fire-
arm was in or affected commerce. As unlikely as this is given the de minimis standard,
the statute would not apply, and the domestic violence misdemeanant would not be
prohibited from possessing firearms. The statute would then fail to protect this defen-
dant's family from domestic violence, and thus fail to achieve its fundamental
objective.
104. E.g., United States v. Ficke, 58 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1075 (D. Neb. 1999).
105. E.g., United States v. Nason, No. 00-CR-37-B-S, 2001 WL 123722, at *5-6 (D.
Me. Feb. 13, 2001); United States v. Weeks, No. CRIM. 00-4-B-H, 2000 WL 1879808,
at *1 (D. Me. Sept. 28, 2000); United States v. Costigan, No. CRIM. 00-9-B-H, 2000
WL 898455, at *5 (D. Me. June 16, 2000), aftd, 2001 WL 535734 (1st Cir. Mar. 26,
2001); United States v. Cadden, 98 F. Supp. 2d 193, 195 (D.R.I. 2000); United States v.
Smith, 964 F. Supp. 286 (N.D. Iowa 1997), affd, 171 F.3d 617 (8th Cir. 1999).
106. Supra note 15.
107. United States v. Ficke, 58 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1072 (D. Neb. 1999).
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control classes.10 8 Four years later, Nebraska police officers ar-
rested Ficke in his home after his wife reported to the police that
he had assaulted her.' 9 The officers confiscated three firearms
from Fiske, which he admitted were shipped in interstate com-
merce.11° After being indicted, Ficke moved to dismiss the indict-
ment arguing that the Laudenberg Amendment unconstitutionally
violated fundamental due process principles of notice and fair
warning. 1 '
Ficke argued it was fundamentally unfair to punish him for vio-
lating the Amendment when he did not know that federal law pro-
hibited his possession of firearms1 12 Relying on Judge Posner's
dissent in United States v. Wilson,113 the court found for the defen-
dant. In Wilson, Judge Posner suggested that ignorance of the law
can indeed, be an excuse for breaking it:
[I]t is wrong to convict a person of a crime if he had no reason to
believe that the act for which he was convicted was a crime, or
even that it was wrongful .... We can release him from the trap
by interpreting the statute under which he was convicted to re-
quire the government to prove that the violator knew that he
was committing a crime. This is the standard device by which
the courts [would then be able to] avoid having to explore the
outer boundaries of the constitutional requirement of fair notice
of potential criminal liability." 4
The Ficke court stated that Posner's argument was especially ap-
plicable where the conduct consisted of gun ownership, an activity
otherwise legal for citizens with no prior felony convictions. 15
Moreover, the defendant did not have a reasonable opportunity to
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1072-73. In the past, the Supreme Court has struck down "criminal pro-
visions which similarly [to the Lautenberg Amendment] snared unsuspecting citi-
zens." Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 229-30 (1957).
112. Id. at 1073; see also United States v. Mendoza, 172 F.3d 865, *1 (4th Cir. 1999)
(unpublished opinion) (stating "that the term 'knowingly' . . . requires only that a
defendant knew he possessed a firearm; not that he knew his possession was illegal or
knew where the weapon was manufactured" (citing United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d
602, 606 (4th Cir. 1995)); United States v. Hancock, No. 99-10533, 2000 WL 1593394,
at *2 (9th Cir. Oct. 26, 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1641 (2001) (stating that the
"mental-state requirement for [the statute] is 'knowingly' ... and refers only to
knowledge of possession").
113. United States v. Wilson, 159 F.3d 280, 293 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, J.,
dissenting).
114. Id. (referring to Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994) and Staples v.
United States, 511 U.S. 600, 618-19 (1994)).
115. Ficke, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 1074.
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learn about the statute, 116 because at the time he plead no contest
to gun ownership, the Lautenberg Amendment had not yet been
passed.' 17 The Ficke court therefore found that the Lautenberg
Amendment violated the notice and fair warning requirements of
the Due Process Clause.
In United States v. Napier,' 18 however, the Sixth Circuit rejected
the ignorance of the law defense, arguing it was unreasonable for a
domestic violence misdemeanant to expect to possess weapons
without regulation. Therefore, the defendant could not claim a
lack of fair warning.' 9 In United States v. Beavers,2 ° the Sixth Cir-
cuit again adopted this rationale, finding the Lautenberg Amend-
ment constitutional even though it lacks an actual knowledge
requirement.'12
In United States v. Mitchell,122 the Fourth Circuit explained that
the only knowledge required by the defendant in a Lautenberg
Amendment case is knowledge of possession of a firearm, not
knowledge of the law.123 The Mitchell court found the defendant
had sufficient notice when he committed the assault upon his wife
that led to his domestic violence misdemeanor conviction. 24
Therefore, also in opposition to Ficke, the Mitchell court concluded
that ignorance of the law is not a sufficient defense in a Lautenberg
Amendment case.125
Although Ficke and Emerson are still good law, the majority of
subsequent case law suggests the ignorance of the law defense will
not succeed in striking down the Lautenberg Amendment as an
unconstitutional Due Process Clause violation. This case law is
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1075.
118. United States v. Napier, 233 F.3d 394, 398 (6th Cir. 2000).
119. Id. (quoting United States v. Baker, 197 F.3d. 211, 220 (6th Cir. 1999)).
120. United States v. Beavers, 206 F.3d 706 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1121
(2000).
121. Id. at 709-710 (finding the statute constitutional even though the government
does not have to prove the defendant had actual knowledge that it was illegal to
possess a firearm). According to the Napier court, "every circuit court which has
considered a due process challenge similar to Napier's has rejected it." Napier, 233
F.3d at 398; see, e.g., United States v. Kafka, 222 F.3d 1129, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000),
cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1365 (2001); United States v. Reddick, 203 F.3d 767, 770-71
(10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 225-26 (1st Cir. 1999); United
States v. Bostic, 168 F.3d 718, 722-23 (4th Cir. 1999); United States v. Wilson, 159 F.3d
280, 288-89 (7th Cir. 1998).
122. United States v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied 531 U.S.
849 (2000).
123. Id. at 322 (quoting Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 192 (1998)).
124. Id. at 323-24.
125. Id. (citing Barlow v. United States, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 404, 411 (1833)).
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flawed, however, in its failure to acknowledge misdemeanants who,
aside from the Lautenberg Amendment, would be in lawful posses-
sion of their guns. Given that the Lautenberg Amendment is fairly
new, 126 and that knowledge of the Lautenberg Amendment has not
been widely disseminated,127 it is unreasonable to expect even a
convicted domestic violence misdemeanant to know he could not
legally possess a gun. This is especially true in parts of the country
where gun possession is a commonly accepted practice. 128 Courts
could reasonably find the Lautenberg Amendment constitutes a
due process violation for failure to adhere to the notice and fair
warning requirement.
B. Definitional Vagueness
Certain terms of the Lautenberg Amendment, such as "prohib-
ited person, ' 129 "physical force, ' 130 and "cohabit[ation] with a
spouse,' 31 are not defined by the statute itself.132 Additionally,
even though terms such as "misdemeanor crime of domestic vio-
lence" and "convicted" are defined,133 courts are still grappling
with how to apply these definitions.134
126. The Amendment was enacted in September 1996.
127. The only means of public awareness is the letter by the Department of Alco-
hol, Tobacco, and Firearms, infra note 221.
128. For example, forty percent of United States households contain guns. U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS 1996, at 167 (1997). Further, "there is a long tradition of wide-
spread lawful gun ownership by private individuals in this country." Staples v. United
States, 511 U.S. 600, 610 (1994).
129. United States v. Cadden, 98 F. Supp. 2d 193, 195 (D.R.I. 2000) (debating the
definition of "prohibited person" in detail).
130. United States v. Nason, No. 00-CR-37-B-S, 2001 WL 123722, at *5 (D. Me.
Feb. 13, 2001); United States v. Weeks, No. CRIM. 00-4-B-H, 2000 WL 1879808, at *1
(D. Me. Sept. 28, 2000).
131. United States v. Costigan, No. CRIM. 00-9-B-H, 2000 WL 898455, at *5 (D.
Me. June 16, 2000), affd, 2001 WL 535734 (1st Cir. Mar. 26, 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.
Ct. 171 (2001). The Costigan court debates the definition of "cohabit[ation] with a
spouse" in detail. See infra text accompanying notes 144-149.
132. 18 U.S.C. § 921 (2000) provides all definitions for Title 18 but does not define
any of the above-mentioned terms. These particular terms are mentioned because
cases have been based on the inability to define them.
133. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(i)(ii), (a)(33)(B)(ii) (2000); supra note 6.
134. Nason, 2001 WL 123722, at *6 (looking to the Black's Law Dictionary defini-
tion of "physical force" because neither the Lautenberg Amendment itself nor rele-
vant Maine case law provided a definition). The Nason court also noted that another
court in the same district in the same week reached a conclusion on this issue "directly
at odds" with the broad definition of "physical force" used by the Nason court. Id. at
*6 (citing United States v. Weeks, 2000 WL 1879808, at *1 (D. Me. Sept. 28, 2000)).
In Nason, the court defined the terms "bodily injury" and "offensive physical
contact:"
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Courts are so uncertain about the meaning of the terms in the
Amendment that in some cases, courts in the same district have
defined the same term differently. 135 If judges are confused about
how to define these terms, ordinary people are also likely con-
fused, and might unknowingly violate the law. The Lautenberg
Amendment, therefore, is unconstitutionally vague.
The standard for constitutional vagueness is set out in United
States v. Smith.'36 A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it "fails to
give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contem-
plated conduct is forbidden by the statute" and "[the language of
the statute] is so indefinite that it encourages arbitrary and erratic
arrests and convictions.' '1 37
In Smith, the defendant was convicted of a domestic violence
misdemeanor. 138 In 1996, the defendant, in possession of a firearm,
shot his wife. 139 Among the issues that defendant raised in his mo-
tion to dismiss was that § 921(a)(33), the definitions section of the
Lautenberg Amendment, is unconstitutionally vague because it
"fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his or
her contemplated conduct is forbidden by statute, fails to establish
minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement and invites arbitrary
and capricious enforcement. 140
The court rejected the definitional vagueness argument, stating
that the "language of Section 921(a)(33) appears to give fair notice
"[B]odily injury" and "offensive physical contact" involve "the use or at-
tempted use of physical force." Id. at *6. Thus, any conviction under
Maine's assault statute "has, as an element, the use or attempted use of
physical force" and qualifies as a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence"
pursuant to section 921(a)(33)(A) if the victim has the requisite domestic
relationship with the assailant.
Id. In Weeks, alternatively, Chief Judge Hornby found the assault at issue did not
include bodily injury, and thus the defendant had pleaded no contest only to offensive
physical contact, which he found, "is not a crime that categorically involves physical
force." Weeks, 2000 WL 1879808, at *2.
135. Compare Nason, 2001 WL 123722, at *6 with Weeks, 2000 WL 1879808, at * 1,
giving two opposing definitions of physical force in the same jurisdiction in the same
week and causing one defendant to be found guilty of a greater charge than his
counterpart.
136. United States v. Smith, 964 F. Supp. 286 (N.D. Iowa 1997), affd, 171 F.3d 617
(8th Cir. 1999).
137. Id. at 294 (citing United States v. Donahue, 948 F.2d 438, 441 (8th Cir. 1991),
which found that a person of ordinary intelligence knows that bank robbery is a
crime).
138. Id. at 288
139. Id.
140. Id. at 294.
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of the conduct prohibited by it"'' and that the terms were readily
understandable. 142 Furthermore, the court found that the statute
provided a bright line for law enforcement, and does not encourage
arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions.' 43 The defendant's
definitional vagueness argument thus failed.
A Maine district court declined to follow the precedent set forth
in Smith. In United States v. Costigan,'4 Chief Judge Hornby of-
fered a different view of the Lautenberg Amendment's definitional
vagueness. 145 The defendant in Costigan was found guilty of pos-
sessing a firearm after being convicted on two previous occasions
of misdemeanor domestic violence crimes.146 Chief Judge Hornby
voiced several reservation about a Lautenberg Amendment provi-
sion requiring the defendant to have "cohabited" with a spouse in
order to have previously committed domestic violence:
[Tihe problems I have outlined with the statute are considera-
ble. Here, for example, because of the second misdemeanor
[which took place, as opposed to the first, after defendant and
victim started to live together fairly regularly], I have not had to
determine the far more difficult question whether Costigan, who
was intimate with Santos, had yet reached the level of 'cohabiting
as a spouse' by the time of the first misdemeanor .. .approxi-
mately one month after they met and her legal husband moved
out. Such issues will not be resolved so easily in a jury trial, for
there the judge must instruct the jury as to what the jury is re-
quired to find beyond a reasonable doubt. What standards will
the judge give the jury to define 'cohabit as a spouse?' ...
[There is no] customary certainty of definition for [this] federal
crime. I suspect that there are many people previously convicted
of assault who are unable to tell from reading the statute whether
their assault was 'domestic violence' such that they can no longer
possess firearms ....
Chief Judge Hornby rightly believed many people previously
convicted of assault would not be able tell from reading the statute
whether their prior assault constituted "domestic violence."' 4 8 For
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. United States v. Costigan, No. CRIM. 00-9-B-H, 2000 WL 898455 (D. Me.
June 16, 2000), affd, 2001 WL 535734 (1st Cir. Mar. 26, 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct.
171 (2001).
145. Id. at *5.
146. Id. at *1.
147. Id. at *5 (emphasis added).
148. Id.
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this reason, the statute is unconstitutionally vague because persons
of ordinary intelligence would not have fair notice they were com-
mitting a crime. 149
III. THE Ex POST FACTO CHALLENGE
Opponents of the Lautenberg Amendment argue the Amend-
ment violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.
An ex post facto law is defined as:
1st. Every law that makes an action, done before the passing of
the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and pun-
ishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or
makes it greater than it was, when committed.1 50
Lautenberg Amendment opponents argue the Amendment is
unconstitutional because it retroactively imposes a criminal penalty
on a domestic violence misdemeanant. In some cases, the misde-
meanant's conviction predates the effective date of the statute;151
in other cases, the Lautenberg Amendment impermissibly punishes
the misdemeanant for a conviction that has already occurred. 15 2
149. United States v. Smith, 964 F. Supp. at 294. Further, the Costigan court con-
victed the defendant under § 922(g)(9) due to the second misdemeanor conviction,
which took place after the defendant had been with Santos for a significantly longer
period, had begun to stay at her home, and had helped discipline her children. Costi-
gan, 2000 WL 898455, at *1-2. However, had the second misdemeanor conviction not
taken place, it would be unclear whether to apply the Lautenberg Amendment in
Costigan. When the first incident of domestic violence took place, Costigan had been
intimate with Santos, but had only been dating her for one month, and her legal hus-
band had just moved out of their home. Id. at *5. As Chief Judge Hornby indicated, it
is unclear under the statute whether this situation would qualify Costigan as "cohab-
iting" with Santos under § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii). Id.
Chief Judge Hornby recognized the statute is ambiguous in such a case, and does not
provide direction definitionally. Id. Therefore, such a determination would be left to
the jury, and the jury would have to make this determination beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. It is unlikely that Congress intended juries to be the ultimate determinants
of the meanings of the terms in § 922(g)(9).
150. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798). U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 forbids
the passage of any ex post facto law. The court in United States v. Lominac, 144 F.3d
308, 311-12 (4th Cir. 1998) stated that:
to violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, a law must (1) be retrospective ... and
(2) it must disadvantage the offender affected by it by altering the definition
of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment of a crime .... A law is
retrospective if it changes the legal consequences of acts completed before
its effective date.
(internal quotations omitted).
151. United States v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 319, 322-23 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531
U.S. 849 (2000).
152. See discussion infra Part (III)(B) discussing the ex post facto challenge in the
military context.
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A. The Civilian Context
In the civilian context, circuit courts and district courts have
found that the Lautenberg Amendment is not an ex post facto
law.153 The justification for this conclusion is that the Amendment
regulates the continuous possession of a firearm by a domestic vio-
lence misdemeanant. 154 The intent, then, is not to punish a misde-
meanant a second time for a prior domestic violence conviction.
Thus, the law does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Therefore, even if the conviction and the purchase of the firearm
occurred prior to the enactment of the Lautenberg Amendment,
the continuous post-enactment possession of the firearm warrants
a felony conviction under the Amendment. 155
B. The Military Context
In the civilian context, Lautenberg Amendment plausibly serves
the crucial remedial function of prohibiting gun possession by
those more likely to commit domestic violence crimes involving
firearms.156 The military context is different.
153. E.g., Mitchell, 209 F.3d at 322; United States v. Farmer, 73 F.3d 836, 841 (8th
Cir. 1996); McHugh v. Rubin, 49 F. Supp. 2d 105, 108 (E.DN.Y. 1999), rev'd on other
grounds, 220 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. Boyd, 52 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1236-
37 (D. Kan. 1999), affd, 211 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Hicks, 992 F.
Supp. 1244, 1246 (D. Kan. 1997); United States v. Meade, 986 F. Supp. 66, 69 (D.
Mass. 1997), affid, 175 F.3d 215 (1st Cir. 1999); Nat'l Ass'n of Gov't Employees v.
Barrett, 968 F. Supp. 1564, 1575-76 (N.D. Ga. 1997), affd sub. nom Hiley v. Barrett,
155 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 1998).
154. Supra note 153.
155. Mitchell, 209 F.3d at 322-323 (stating that "[i]t is immaterial that [defendant's]
firearm purchase and domestic violence conviction occurred prior to 922(g)(9)'s en-
actment because the conduct prohibited by Section 922(g)(9) is the possession of a
firearm.") (emphasis added); United States v. Brackett, 163 F.3d 599, 599 (4th Cir.
1998) (concluding that because the possession of the firearm did not take place until
after the effective date of the statute, the statute did not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause); United States v. Boyd, 52 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1236-37 (D. Kan. 1999); Nat'l
Ass'n of Gov't Employees, Inc. v. Barrett, 968 F. Supp. 1564, 1575-76 (N.D. Ga.
1997), affd sub. nom Hiley v. Barrett, 155 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 1998). The Eastern
District of New York in McHugh v. Rubin stated that
[t]he Second Circuit has held that "Congress intended statutes prohibiting
felons from possessing firearms to reach 'persons convicted of felonies prior
to [the effective date of the statute].' . . . While the case at bar involves a
misdemeanor conviction as opposed to a felony, plaintiff has cited no au-
thority to suggest that the same rule relating to felony convictions should not
apply in this instance.
McHugh v. Rubin, 49 F. Supp. 2d 105, 108 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), rev'd on other grounds,
220 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Brady, 26 F.3d 282, 291 (2d Cir.
1994) (citation omitted)).
156. See supra Part (1)(B).
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Domestic violence offenses involving military-issued firearms
are extremely unlikely due to strict procedures involving the distri-
bution, use, and collection of military weapons.157 Military person-
nel usually do not have access to issued weapons on a daily basis,
and some personnel only use weapons during annual training and
certification. 158
Even during the annual training, the weapons are at all times
under strict supervision and control. 159 "First, soldiers must check
out their weapons from the arms rooms. Next, these soldiers are
transported in military vehicles to firing ranges, where they fire the
weapons. Finally, the soldiers are transported back to the arms
rooms, where the weapons must be returned." 160 Thus, it is very
unlikely a soldier would ever have an issued weapon at home, or
anywhere but the training grounds, under constant, strict
supervision.16 1
Therefore, unlike the civilian context, where the Lautenberg
Amendment serves the regulatory and remedial purpose of keep-
ing guns away from domestic violence misdemeanants, the
Lautenberg Amendment does not serve this purpose in the military
context, because military procedure already performs this
function.162
If the Lautenberg Amendment does not serve a regulatory and
remedial purpose in the military context, it seems only to have a
punitive effect. 16 3 Therefore, any domestic violence misdemeanant
in the military is punished a second time for being convicted of the
misdemeanor. This result is unconstitutional under the Ex Post
Facto Clause.164 Further, as most military employment involves
the use of a weapon, the Lautenberg Amendment may effectively
157. Major Einwechter & Captain Christiansen, Note, Abuse Your Spouse and
Lose Your Job: Federal Law Now Prohibits Some Soldiers from Possessing Military
Weapons, 1997 ARMY LAW. 25, 27 (1997); Gregory, supra note 13, at 10-11.
158. Gregory, supra note 13, at 11.
159. Id.
160. Id. "In fact, the Army's control over the weapons is so complete, one Army
legal practitioner has stated that 'weapons issued in the military remain under the
constructive control of the commander during training and deployment missions."'
Id.; see Einwechter & Christiansen, supra note 157, at 27 (discussing the great respon-
sibility of the commander to supervise all soldiers under his or her command).
161. Due to the strict supervision of military-issued firearms, it is not surprising no
cases involving military personnel were cited in the Congressional record accompany-
ing the proposal of the Lautenberg Amendment. Gregory, supra note 157, at 11.
162. Gregory, supra note 13, at 15-16.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 16; supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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terminate the military career of the domestic violence misdemean-
ant, a further punitive measure. 1
65
Given this result, Congress should reconstruct the Lautenberg
Amendment, partially reinstating the public interest exception 166 in
the military context; this would preclude the military from the
reach of the Lautenberg Amendment and the statute would no
longer be in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 67
IV. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE CHALLENGE
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
states that: "No State shall make or enforce any law which
[would] . . .deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." '168 The Amendment strives to ensure
equality for all under the law.169 Under traditional equal protec-
tion analysis, courts apply one of two levels of scrutiny depending
on the specific issues in the case:1 70 strict scrutiny or deferential
scrutiny. 7
1
In determining the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply, courts
look at whether the party in the case is a member of a suspect
class 72 or whether there is a possible infringement of a party's fun-
damental rights. 173 If the party is a member of a suspect class or a
fundamental right is implicated, the court must apply strict scrutiny
165. Gregory, supra note 13, at 16.
166. 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(1); supra note 12. On January 9, 1997, Representative Bart
Stupak (D-MI) proposed a bill to the House of Representatives to exempt police and
the military from Lautenberg disarmament. H.R. 445, 105th Cong. (1997).
167. Gregory, supra note 13, at 18.
168. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
169. Id.
170. WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
891 (2d ed. 1995).
171. See infra text accompanying notes 172 to 177, defining and discussing applica-
tion of strict and deferential scrutiny.
172. Suspect classes include race, national origin, and alienage. Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (applying "strict scrutiny" analysis to strike
down, as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, an Oklahoma state law requiring
sterilization of persons convicted of two or more felonies of moral turpitude); Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S 356, 366-67 (1886) (holding that a San Francisco ordinance
relating to laundry operation violated the equal protection rights of Chinese aliens
operating laundries in San Francisco); MURPHY, supra note 170, at 893.
173. Fundamental rights include the right to privacy, to procreate, to marry, to
vote, and to travel interstate. Loving v. Virginia 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (finding funda-
mental the right to marry); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966) (find-
ing fundamental the right to travel interstate); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
485 (1965) (finding fundamental the right to privacy); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
565 (1964) (finding fundamental the right to vote); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942) (finding fundamental the right to procreate).
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analysis,'74 and a compelling governmental interest is required to
justify the legislation in question.'75 If the party is not a member of
a suspect class, and no fundamental right is at stake, the court ap-
plies rational basis review,176 requiring that the law in question be
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.1 77
Courts examining the Lautenberg Amendment thus far have ap-
plied rational basis review.178  The government therefore is re-
quired to demonstrate that singling out persons convicted of
domestic violence offenses for the firearms possession felonies is
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. 179
A. Under Rational Basis Review, Is the Lautenberg
Amendment Underinclusive, Overinclusive, or Both?
Opponents of the Lautenberg Amendment have asserted it is
both overinclusive and underinclusive and cannot withstand ra-
tional basis review.18 0  Proponents of the overinclusivity theory
suggest that it is "illogical to preclude all those who have been con-
victed of domestic violence crimes from possessing a gun, no mat-
ter how long ago their offenses may have occurred."'' 8 ' This
argument was introduced in several cases involving police officers
who believe that the Lautenberg Amendment should not have pre-
cluded the public interest exception allowing police officers to pos-
sess their weapons. 82
174. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
175. Id. at 227.
176. MURPHY, supra note 170, at 891-94.
177. Id.
178. E.g., Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 173 F.3d 898, 907 (D.C. Cir.
1999); United States v. Lewitzke, 176 F.3d 1022, 1025-26 (7th Cir. 1999) (acknowledg-
ing that the parties stipulated that rational basis review applied); Nat'l Ass'n of Gov't
Employees v. Barrett, 968 F. Supp. 1564, 1575-76 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (applying rational
basis review), affd sub. nom, Hiley v. Barrett, 155 F.3d 1.276 (11th Cir. 1998).
179. Lewitzke, 176 F.3d at 1025 (quoting City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S.
297, 303 (1976)).
180. Lewitzke, 176 F.3d at 1025.
181. Id.
182. Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 709 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied,
528 U.S. 1116 (2000) (stating the Lautenberg Amendment is overinclusive because it
prohibits the public interest exception); see Fraternal Order of Police v. United States,
981 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1997), rev'd, 152 F.3d 998 (D.C. Cir), and reh'g granted, 159
F.3d 1362 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam), and affd on reh'g, 173 F.3d 898 (D.C. Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 928 (1999). At the district court level, focusing on the
preclusion of the public interest exception in the Lautenberg Amendment, the court
for the District of Columbia found that Congress had no rational basis to distinguish
between police officers who were domestic violence misdemeanants and those who
had committed violent conduct resulting in a felony conviction. Fraternal Order of
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Proponents of the underinclusivity theory argue that Congress
acted irrationally in "sing[ling] out those who engage in domestic
violence for the firearms ban, when those convicted of other vio-
lent misdemeanors may be just as likely to misuse their guns. ' 183
In countering this argument, however, courts have looked to the
established principle that Congress may "take one step at a time,
addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most
acute to the legislative mind.1 84 Therefore, the underinclusiveness
theory has failed to successfully challenge the Lautenberg Amend-
ment on equal protection grounds.
With the exception of Fraternal Order of Police v. United
States, 85 where the District Court of the District of Columbia ini-
tially found an equal protection violation but was reversed,186
courts nationwide concluded that Congress had a sufficient rational
basis to introduce the Lautenberg Amendment.1 8 7 The rational ba-
sis for the Amendment lies in Congress's attempt to mend the
loophole that has allowed so many violent felons to plea-bargain
down to misdemeanors. 88 Prior to the Lautenberg Amendment,
felons who successfully plead down to misdemeanors evaded the
Gun Control Act's ban on gun possession by convicted felons. 89
The Lautenberg Amendment strives to prevent this evasion and to
Police, 981 F. Supp. at 4-5. On rehearing, the D.C. Circuit reversed the prior decision,
recognizing Congress's right to address problems "one step at a time." 173 F.3d at 903
(citation omitted); Gilbert G. Gallegos, Letters to the Editor: Giving Gun Law Our
Best Shot, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 1997, at A13 (stating that the Fraternal Order of Police
had reservations about the constitutionality of the statute prior to and after its enact-
ment, and was concerned that police officers might be penalized to "a far greater
degree than the general populace" under the statute). The argument relating to the
preclusion of the public interest exception was rejected by the court in Gillespie rea-
soning that even if a police officer had a gun for public interest reasons, this would not
prevent him from hurting someone in his home. The Gillespie court therefore con-
cluded that the reason for having the gun is irrelevant, but the criminal history of the
possessor determines his accessibility to firearms. Gillespie, 185 F.3d at 709.
183. Lewitzke, 176 F.3d at 1025.
184. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). The
Lewitzke court concluded that "persons already convicted of domestic violence are
[thus] a logical starting, if not ending, point." Lewitzke, 176 F.3d at 1027.
185. Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 981 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1997).
186. Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 173 F.3d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
187. E.g. Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 118-19 (1983) (empha-
sizing the increased risk of grievous harm when firearms fall into the wrong hands);
City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976); Lewitzke, 176 F.3d at 1025;
Baer v. City of Wauwatosa, 716 F.2d 1117, 1123 (7th Cir. 1983).
188. See 104 CONG. REC. S10377-78 (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
189. Pressler, supra note 3, at 719; supra text accompanying note 1.
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further the government's goal of reducing gun-related domestic vi-
olence nationwide.190
As the court stated in United States v. Lewitzke,191 persons con-
victed of such offenses have already employed violence against
their domestic partners on one or more occasions.' 92 It is reasona-
ble for Congress to believe that such individuals may resort to vio-
lence again. If they do, access to a firearm increases the risk they
will inflict grave harm, particularly to members of their household
who have fallen victim to their violent acts before.193
Therefore, the Lewitzke Court reasoned that because domestic
violence misdemeanants have already been recognized as having a
propensity toward violence in the home, Congress rationally con-
cluded that allowing access to firearms would increase the risk of
recurrence of such violence. 94
V. FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF
STATUTORY IMPLEMENTATION
Even if its constitutionality continues to be upheld by courts, the
Lautenberg Amendment will not achieve its goals due to inherent
flaws in its structure and implementation. These flaws primarily
stem from two weaknesses: terms that are definitionally vague1 95
and a lack of clarity as to the appropriate method of procedural
execution. This obscurity is due to uncertainty in both the civilian
and military contexts of whether to look to state or federal law to
define the terms of the statute, and from a lack of sufficient gui-
dance from Congress on how the statute should be implemented.
Since the Lautenberg Amendment's vagueness has already been
discussed, this Part will focus on the Amendment's structural and
implementation weaknesses.196
A. Whether to Use Federal or State Law in Defining
Statutory Terms
One cause of confusion in implementing the Lautenberg
Amendment is the uncertainty as to which law should define the
190. Pressler, supra note 3, at 719.
191. United States v. Lewitzke, 176 F.3d 1022 (7th Cir. 1999).
192. Lewitzke, 176 F.3d at 1027.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. In fact, the Fraternal Order of Police believed, when the statute was passed,
that its terms were unconstitutionally vague. Gallegos, supra note 182.
196. Supra Part (II)(B).
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terms of the statute. 197 In United States v. Cadden, 98 for example,
the defendant plead no contest' 99 in 1998 to simple domestic as-
sault, a domestic violence misdemeanor. 20 0 The defendant re-
ceived and completed a one-year term of probation.20 1 A year and
a half later, the defendant plead guilty to one count of possession
of destructive devices-two pipe bombs.20 2 Under the Lautenberg
Amendment, pipe bombs are considered "firearms. °203 The issue
in the case was whether the defendant would be considered a "pro-
hibited person" in possession of a firearm under the statute, be-
cause he had already completed his probationary term.20 4
Looking to the definitions section of Title 18,205 the court em-
phasized that "[w]hat constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall
be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in
which the proceedings were held. 20 6
The court continued by recognizing, however, that the definition
of "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" does not include ref-
erence to state law.20 7 Therefore, it reasoned, the presumption is
Congress intended federal law to define what constitutes a convic-
tion under the Amendment because "where a statute, with refer-
ence to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of such
provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject...
show[s] that a different intention existed. ' 20 8 The court therefore
found that under federal law, defendant's no contest plea and pro-
bation constituted a "conviction" and the defendant was a "prohib-
ited person" in possession of a firearm under the Amendment.0 9
Even though the Cadden court concluded that federal law sup-
plies the definitions of the Lautenberg Amendment's terms, the
statute itself does not mandate such a conclusion. As the Cadden
court recognized, § 921 emphasizes that definitions of statutory
terms in the Lautenberg Amendment should be determined under
197. Supra Part (II)(B).
198. United States v. Cadden, 98 F. Supp. 2d 193 (D.R.I. 2000).
199. "Nolo," or "nolo contendere" means "no contest." BLACK'S LAW DiCTIONARY
1070 (7th ed. 1999).
200. Cadden, 98 F. Supp. 2d at 194.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. 18 U.S.C. § 921(3)(D)-(4)(A)(i) (2000).
204. Cadden, 98 F. Supp. 2d at 195.
205. 18 U.S.C. § 921 (2000).
206. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (2000).
207. Cadden, 98 F.Supp. 2d at 196.
208. Id. at 196 (citing 2B NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CON-
STRUCTION § 51.02, at 122-23 (5th ed. 1992)).
209. Id. at 197.
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the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings take place.21°
Only because the court concluded that the term "misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence" does not include reference to state
law, did the court then define "conviction" under federal law.
Other courts could decide this issue differently, and define "con-
viction" according to state law. The lack of clarity as to whether
federal or state law prevails in the Lautenberg Amendment context
could cause courts to apply the Lautenberg Amendment differ-
ently and arbitrarily.21'
The Lautenberg Amendment also excludes from punishment
misdemeanants who were deprived of a "knowing and intelligent
waiver of a jury trial. ' 212 As will later be discussed, Senator
Lautenberg proposed the Lautenberg Amendment to close the
loophole created by numerous judges who knocked domestic vio-
lence felonies down to misdemeanors.213 If judges already tend to-
ward leniency in sentencing domestic violence offenders,214 nothing
would prevent these judges from dismissing charges against domes-
tic violence misdemeanants based on the technicality that such de-
fendants did not knowingly and intelligently waive a jury trial.
Just as violent felons go free on Miranda21 5 technicalities,21 6 do-
mestic violence misdemeanants will go free on waiver technicali-
ties. They will be free to return to their homes, access the very
guns from which the Lautenberg Amendment was meant to protect
their families, and harm their wives and children, rendering the
Lautenberg Amendment moot. Congress should guide the courts
as to which law to apply, and reword the statute to reduce empha-
210. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(B).
211. Again, if courts are so conflicted about how to apply Lautenberg due to the
Amendment's murky wording, it is possible to argue an ordinary person would not
understand the Amendment and might unknowingly violate Lautenberg. Supra Part
(II)(B).
212. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii); United States v. Akins, 243 F.3d 1199,1205 (9th
Cir. 2001) (reiterating that knowing and intelligent waiver is an element of the
Lautenberg Amendment but finding the defendant did not waive his rights).
213. 104 CONG. REC. S10377.
214. Id.
215. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 492-99 (1966).
216. The Miranda warnings include the right to remain silent and the right to an
attorney. Id. at 439. Constitutionally, the warnings must be given to all suspects prior
to custodial interrogation. Id. at 499. If the warnings are not given, any confessions
obtained from subsequent interrogation is inadmissible in court. Id. at 492-99. In his
dissent in Miranda, Justice White emphasized the threat to public safety if the courts
returned violent criminal offenders such as killers and rapists to the streets due to
Miranda violations. Id. at 542-43 (White, J., dissenting).
LAUTENBERG AMENDMENT
sis on technicalities that will enlarge the loophole Congress sought
to close with the passage of the Lautenberg Amendment. 17
B. Lack of Sufficient Guidance or Awareness to Effectively
Implement the Lautenberg Amendment
The Lautenberg Amendment is difficult to realistically imple-
ment in both civilian and military contexts. Insufficient guidance
as to how to implement the statute may be causing the police and
military to ignore the statute or not rigorously enforce it.218 Lack
of public awareness of the Lautenberg Amendment inhibits its
ability to achieve its goals of deterrence in both the civilian and
military contexts.
1. The Civilian Context
In the civilian context, the "knowing" standard only requires a
defendant to know he possessed a firearm at the time of arrest, not
that he knowingly violated the law.219 In early 1997, the Depart-
ment of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
("ATF") released an "Open Letter to all State and Local Law En-
forcement Officials" explaining the Lautenberg Amendment and
the recommended procedures for dealing with affected individu-
217. In United States v. Jackson, the defendant unsuccessfully argued he had not
authorized his attorney to enter a guilty plea for his domestic violence misdemeanor
charge. United States v. Jackson, 213 F.3d 644, at *1 (9th Cir. 2000) (unpublished
opinion), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 914 (2000). The standard of review used by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in its determination was the clearly
erroneous standard. Id. The court found Jackson's attorney had fully advised Jackson
of his constitutional rights. Id. Jackson's attorney testified his normal practice was to
advise clients of their constitutional rights prior to pleading on their behalf so the plea
would not be without authorization. Id. Although his attorney advised him of his
constitutional rights in this case, it is not clear from the record that Jackson under-
stood those rights, or that the attorney clearly explained to him the implications of a
guilty plea in the Lautenberg context. Id. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit did not find
the district court clearly erroneous in convicting Jackson. Id.
218. Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments Chairman of Joint
Chiefs of Staff et. al., Issues 2D, 3B-3C at 41, 53-54 [hereinafter Memorandum] (on
file with author), available at http://www.dtic.mil/domesticviolence/Report.pdf. For a
more in depth discussion on the contents of the Memorandum, see infra note 247 and
accompanying text.
219. E.g., United States v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 319, 322 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 849 (2000); see supra Part IV.
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als.22° The ATF also released an open letter to the public at this
time.2
Each letter stated its purpose was to provide the targeted group
with "information concerning a recent amendment to the Gun
Control Act of 1968. "1222 Each letter then described the
Lautenberg Amendment, and defined the term "misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence. 223
In its letter to the public, the ATF instructed "individuals subject
to this disability" to "immediately lawfully dispose of their firearms
and ammunition. '224 The ATF recommended that "such persons
relinquish their firearms to a third party, such as their attorney...
their local police agency, or a Federal firearms dealer. 225
In its letter to law enforcement agencies, the ATF explained the
preclusion of the public interest exception 226 and attendant
consequences:
In view of this amendment's effect on law enforcement officers,
your department may want to determine if an employee who is
authorized to carry a firearm is subject to this disability and
what appropriate action should be taken. Employees subject to
this disability must immediately dispose of all firearms and am-
munition in their possession .... In cases where your agency
becomes aware of individuals subject to the disability, we rec-
ommend that such persons be encouraged to relinquish all fire-
arms and ammunition in their possession immediately to a third
party, such as their attorney, their local police agency, or a fire-
arms dealer.2 7
With these letters, the ATF made the new amendment available
to the public. However, the ATF did not explain in detail the
method of enforcement to be used by law enforcement in pursuing
Lautenberg Amendment cases. The agency recommended newly
220. John W. Magaw, Director, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Open
Letter to All State and Local Law Enforcement Officials, http://www.atf.treas.gov/
firearms/domestic/opltrleo.htm (last updated Feb. 27, 1998).
221. John W. Magaw, Director, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Open
Letter from the Director, http:// www.atf.treas.gov/firearms/domestic/opitratf.htm
(last updated Feb. 27, 1998). The ATF also included on its website a page of "Misde-
meanor Crime of Domestic Violence Questions and Answers." See http://
www.atf.treas.gov/firearms/domestic/qa.htm (as of Apr. 28, 1997).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Magaw, supra note 220.
227. Id.
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disabled individuals to immediate relinquish their firearms 228 and
advised such individuals that criminal consequences existed upon
failure to adhere to the new law.229 The ATF did not, however,
sufficiently indicate the likelihood of criminal prosecution for fail-
ing to come forward. Further, it did not describe any specific re-
sponsibility of law enforcement agencies to actively research or
seek out Lautenberg Amendment offenders. If law enforcement
agencies were given such responsibility, it could well impede other
police activities and become an inefficient and overbearing process.
Given these omissions, the ATF did not adequately advise law en-
forcement or the public about the Lautenberg Amendment.
Furthermore, if a domestic violence misdemeanant discovered
his or her conviction was no longer on record, he or she would not
likely come forward voluntarily to relinquish firearms. Only in re-
cent decades have criminal records been kept on computers where
they are easily available.230 Any person convicted of a domestic
violence misdemeanor prior to the advent of computer records
would not likely volunteer such information at the risk of losing his
gun. Because the ATF did not explain what penalties would exist
for failing to come forward under the Lautenberg Amendment, the
agency failed to adequately alert law enforcement and the public of
the meaning of the new law. Therefore, the Amendment cannot
effectively be implemented.
2. The Military Context
Soon after Congress passed the Lautenberg Amendment, the
Army released a guide to its implementation.231 Published in
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. E.g., Michael V. Saxi, The Struggle to Make Stalking a Crime: A Legislative
Road Map of How to Develop Effective Stalking Legislation in Maine, 23 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 57, 100 (1998) (discussing the Maine stalking statute providing officers with
"immediate access to criminal records through a statewide computer system").
231. Gregory, supra note 13, at 5 n.20 (citing Message, 151100Z Jan. 98, Headquar-
ters, Dep't of Army, DAPE-MPE, subject: HQDA Message on Interim Implementa-
tion of Lautenberg Amendment (Jan. 11, 1998) (on file with Headquarters,
Department of the Army) (hereinafter HQDA I)). HQDA I reads:
Commanders will detail soldiers who they have reason to believe have a
conviction for a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence to duties that do
not require the bearing of weapons or ammunition. Commanders may reas-
sign soldiers ... where appropriate. No adverse action may be taken against
soldiers solely on the basis of an inability to possess a firearm or ammunition
due to conviction of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence if the act ...
occurred on or before 30 September 1996. Commanders may initiate ad-
verse action, including bars to reenlistment or processing for elimination
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1998,232 the guide made the unit commander responsible for seek-
ing out and reassigning affected soldiers.233 It is difficult for a com-
mander to determine, however, to whom the statute applies,
because the military does not have a database of soldiers convicted
of domestic violence misdemeanors, especially if such convictions
took place prior to the soldier's enlistment.234 In addition, for com-
manders to take a significant amount of time to probe the history
of each soldier under their command would detract from their re-
sponsibilities to adequately train their soldiers.235 Thus, the guide
set unrealistic implementational goals.
If a commander has "reasonable cause to believe" a soldier has a
domestic violence misdemeanor conviction, the commander must
present any available documentation to the Army's legal depart-
ment. 236 The legal department is then responsible for determining
whether the Lautenberg Amendment applies in each individual
case. 237 Army legal departments are bound by state law.2 38 There-
fore, depending on the state where a particular soldier is stationed,
the soldier may or may not be subject to the Lautenberg Amend-
ment's prohibition of firearms possession and use.239 The Army's
under applicable regulations against soldiers because of an inability to pos-
sess a firearm or ammunition due to conviction of a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence if the act ... occurred after 30 September 1996 and after
providing such soldiers a reasonable time to seek expunction of the convic-
tion or pardon. This policy concerning adverse action is not meant to restrict
a commander's authority to initiate separation of a soldier based on the con-
duct that led to the qualifying conviction.
Gregory, supra note 13, at 5 n.20.
The army released HQDA II on May 21, 1999, also relating to the implementation of
the Lautenberg Amendment. Gregory, supra note 13, at *5 n.21 (citing Message,
211105Z May 99, Headquarters, Dep't of Army, subject: HQDA Guidance on De-
ployment Eligibility, Assignment, and Reporting of Soldiers Affected by the
Lautenberg Amendment (May 21, 1999) (on file with Headquarters, Department of
the Army) (hereinafter HQDA II)). HQDA II states that "[ajll soldiers known to
have, or soldiers whom commanders have reasonable cause to believe have, a convic-
tion for a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence are non-deployable for missions
that require possession of firearms or ammunition." Gregory, supra note 13, at 5 n.21.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Gregory, supra note 13, at 5.
235. Id. at 16-17. There is no indication what enforcement body, if any, would be
monitoring the commanders to ensure effective completion of tasks under HQDA I.
Further, it is unclear whether the commanders would pass down responsibility of in-
vestigating the criminal histories of the soldiers to sergeants and other lower com-
manding officers, and if so, what level of investigation they would complete.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 6.
238. Id.
239. Id.
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local legal department must undergo a Lautenberg Amendment
analysis in each case, determining, for example, whether the soldier
had been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence
under state law, and whether the soldier had knowingly and intelli-
gently waived a jury trial.240
If the legal department determines a soldier is prohibited from
using a firearm based on a prior domestic violence misdemeanor
conviction, the commander must reassign the soldier.241 As stated
in HDQA I, the commander may take no adverse action against a
soldier whose conviction took place prior to the passage of the
Amendment. 42 Commanders may initiate adverse action, how-
ever, against soldiers convicted of a domestic violence misde-
meanor subsequent to Lautenberg's enactment.243 In either
scenario, the soldier's conviction likely will hinder career advance-
ment in the military.244
Given this result, the military is concerned that the Lautenberg
Amendment interferes with military readiness.245 Not only are
commanders significantly hampered by the new investigative re-
sponsibility created by the Amendment and the HDQA Guide, but
recruitment may also be detrimentally affected by the
Amendment.246
On February 28, 2001, The Defense Task Force on Domestic Vi-
olence established by Congress to review domestic violence in the
military, provided its annual report to Secretary of Defense Don-
ald Rumsfeld (the "Memorandum") that included a section on mil-
itary awareness of the Lautenberg Amendment. 47 In its analysis,
240. It is also unclear which state law would be applied in making these determina-
tions, the state in which the crime took place, or the state in which the soldier is
stationed. Each state has its own domestic violence laws, so a soldier could feasibly
be convicted in one state, but not the other. Id.
241. Gregory, supra note 13, at 9.
242. Id.; see HQDA I, supra note 231, at 5 n.20.
243. Gregory, supra note 13, at 9-10.
244. Id. at 9 (likening a commander's knowledge of a misdemeanor crime of do-
mestic violence to a "constructive dismissal").
245. Id. at 16. Gregory's argument is that the Amendment's impact on military
readiness is not direct, given that the Amendment effects only .20% of army person-
nel. Id. Nevertheless, he feels that the indirect impact caused by the burden on the
commander and the reduced level of recruitment sufficiently hampers military readi-
ness. Id. at 17; Bruce T. Smith, Disarming the Soldier, FED. LAw., May, 1997, at 16.
246. Gregory, supra note 13, at 17 (arguing the Amendment may have a chilling
effect because potential recruits may be discouraged from applying for military ser-
vice if they have any kind of blemish on their records related to a domestic violence
offense, even though it did not constitute a conviction).
247. Memorandum, supra note 218, at 41, 53-54.
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the Task Force recognized there is varying understanding among
military commanders and personnel as to their responsibilities
under the Lautenberg Amendment.248
Further, although the Department of Defense ("DOD") issued
policy guidelines when the Lautenberg Amendment was initially
passed,249 the Department has not provided further guidance for
determining whether specific personnel are subject to the
Lautenberg Amendment.2 50 However, the Memorandum did note
there have been few Lautenberg Amendment discharges to date,251
and that military personnel are being allowed to retain their weap-
ons until they are discharged or separated from military service. 2
This practice suggests that the Act has failed thus far to dissuade
domestic abuse committed by military personnel.
Further, in response to the concern that the Lautenberg Amend-
ment may hamper recruitment, the Memorandum noted that the
military has begun to issue moral waivers2 53 to recruits with both
felony and misdemeanor convictions. 54 According to the Memo-
randum, the granting of such waivers is increasing, and includes
waivers of those convicted of domestic violence felonies and misde-
meanors.25 5 In granting these waivers, the military is circum-
venting the Lautenberg Amendment, allowing convicted domestic
violence misdemeanants to maintain and use weapons during mili-
tary service.
As a result of its findings, the Task Force recommended that the
Department of Defense "[e]nsure that the Services are complying
with the DOD . . . policy review the appropriateness of waivers
issued since the... policy went into effect, '2 56 and "issue final gui-
dance on implementing the Lautenberg Amendment. 2 57 The Task
248. Id. at 41.
249. The Department of Defense issued interim policy guidance on the Amend-
ment on October 22, 1997 "requiring commanding officers to take immediate steps to
retrieve weapons and ammunition from any service member who has a conviction for
a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence." Id. at 54.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. These waivers enable recruits with criminal backgrounds to enter military ser-
vice. Since this policy became effective, a number of waivers have been granted to
individuals convicted of various domestic violence offenses. Id. at 53.
254. Id. The Memorandum clarifies that although mid-level recruiting commanders
can waive misdemeanors, only senior level officials can approve felony waivers. Mem-
orandum, supra note 220, at 53.
255. Id. at 53.
256. Id. at 53.
257. Id. at 54.
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Force recognized the implementational flaws of the Lautenberg
Amendment in the military context, due to confusion and lack of
guidance. 8 More guidance must be given before the Lautenberg
Amendment can be effectively applied, or achieve its intended pur-
pose of reducing domestic violence in the military.
3. Policy Concerns
In both the civilian and military contexts, policy concerns call for
a reworking, if not a repealing of the Lautenberg Amendment. Of
primary concern is the self-defense of women.259 While the
Amendment may keep guns from male offenders, it also prevents
women from possessing firearms as protective devices. 260 This is a
principal reason that Representative Chenoweth-Hage (R-ID) pro-
posed House Bill 3444, a bill to repeal the Lautenberg Amend-
ment.26 1 House Bill 3444 was co-sponsored by twenty-seven
congressmen 262 and was introduced in the House of Representa-
tives on November 18, 1999.263 Many women's organizations have
strongly supported the bill, including Concerned Women for
America, the largest women's organization in the United States,
the Home School Legal Defense Association, the Law Enforce-
ment Alliance of America, Gun Owners of America, Women
Against Gun Control, and Safety for Women and Responsible
Motherhood. 6
258. Id.
259. States' Rights and Second and Tenth Amendment Restoration Act of 1999,
H.R. 3444, 106th Cong. (1999) (asserting the risk of disarming battered women who
cannot then protect themselves from abusive spouses). In House Bill 3444, Represen-
tative Helen Chenoweth-Hage also asserts the Lautenberg Amendment unconstitu-
tionally violates the Second Amendment, the Tenth Amendment, the Commerce
Clause, and the Ex Post Facto Clause.
260. Id.
261. Id. The bill was previously known as the States' Rights and Second and Tenth
Amendment Restoration Act of 1997, H.R. 1009, 105th Cong. (1997). Representative
Chenoweth-Hage also proposed the earlier bill.
262. http://www.ncadv.org/publicpolicy/novupdate.htm (last visited May 11, 2001)
[hereinafter NCADV website]. This is the website of the National Coalition Against
Domestic Violence, avid supporters of the Lautenberg Amendment. One such co-
sponsor was Representative Mike Simpson (R-ID) who emphasized the risk of dis-
arming women in abusive relationships: "In some instances, this has resulted in the
death of the battered spouse because they were not able to defend themselves with a
firearm." http://www.house.gov/simpson/currentevents.htm (last visited May 11,
2001).
263. http://www.gunowners.org (last visited May 11, 2001). This is the website of a
women's pro-gun organization, who strongly advocates House Bill 3444.
264. Id.
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In House Bill 3444, Representative Chenoweth-Hage asserts
that "[l]aw-abiding citizens use guns to defend themselves against
criminals as many as 2.5 million times every year. Of these self-
defense cases, as many as 200,000 are by women defending them-
selves against sexual assault. 2 65 She therefore calls for a repeal of
the entire Lautenberg Amendment in the effort to improve these
devastating statistics. 66 House Bill 3444 was referred to the House
Judiciary Committee, and then to its Subcommittee on Crime.267
However, no further action has yet been taken.268 The strong sup-
port for House Bill 3444 and the sound policy concerns which have
prompted the proposal of the bill intensify the need to rework the
Amendment, and if not to repeal it completely, certainly to reas-
sess its scope.
CONCLUSION
Senator Lautenberg's intent in introducing the Lautenberg
Amendment is commendable. Protecting families nationwide from
domestic violence is a fundamentally important goal. That is why it
is imperative to rework and restructure the Lautenberg Amend-
ment. The Lautenberg Amendment must unquestionably pass
constitutional muster to be effectively implemented and achieve its
important goal.
As it now stands, the Lautenberg Amendment faces strong con-
stitutional challenges.269 The statute violates the Commerce
Clause under the Supreme Court's decision in Morrison.T° Fur-
ther, the de minimis standard does not create a satisfactory nexus
between gun-related domestic violence and interstate commerce to
265. Id.
266. Representatives Barr (R-GA) and Stupak (D-MI) also proposed bills to
amend the Lautenberg Amendment, but only Representative Chenoweth-Hage's bill
calls for a complete repeal of the Amendment. "To amend title 18, United States
Code, to provide that the firearms prohibitions applicable by reason of a domestic
violence misdemeanor conviction do not apply if the conviction occurred ...." H.R.
59, 106th Cong. (1999) (proposing that the Lautenberg Amendment not be applied
retroactively); H.R. 445, 105th Cong. (1997) (exempting police and the military from
the reach of the Lautenberg Amendement).
267. NCADV website, supra note 262.
268. Further, Representative Chenoweth-Hage will be retiring from the House of
Representatives next year, so it is unclear what will happen to the bill if the House
Subcommittee on Crime fails come to a decision soon. NCADV website, supra note
262.
269. See discussion supra Parts I-IV.
270. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); see discussion supra Part(I)(B)(iii).
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justify the passage of the Lautenberg Amendment under the Com-
merce Clause.271
The Lautenberg Amendment is also arguably vague, thus violat-
ing the Due Process Clause of the Constitution because it "fails to
give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice '12 that it is illegal
to possess a gun after being convicted of a domestic violence mis-
demeanor. Further, the ignorance-of-the-law defense arguably
could defeat a Lautenberg charge in certain scenarios. The statute
violates due process, resulting in individuals with no awareness of
the law being wrongfully convicted.273
In the military context, the statute constitutes an impermissible
ex post facto law because it serves only a punitive effect.2 74 It pun-
ishes an enlisted domestic violence misdemeanant a second time
for having been convicted.275 Even if the Lautenberg Amendment
withstands these constitutional challenges, inherent structural and
implementational flaws prevent the Amendment from achieving its
purpose: the reduction of gun-related domestic violence nation-
wide. Confusion in the courts whether to define statutory terms
through state or federal law risks arbitrary enforcement and reluc-
tance to apply the law. The language of the statute potentially cre-
ates a technical loophole, enabling domestic violence offenders to
evade conviction by arguing they did not knowingly and intelli-
gently waive their right to a jury trial.276
Neither the ATF nor the DOD have sufficiently alerted law en-
forcement, military personnel, or the public about the meaning and
consequences of the Lautenberg Amendment.277 Such lack of gui-
dance, awareness, and understanding of the law risks arbitrary en-
forcement; worse, it risks complete disregard of the law.278 For all
of these reasons, Congress should restructure and rework the
Lautenberg Amendment to bring it within constitutional bounds,
and thus enable its important goal of reducing nation-wide gun-
related domestic violence.
271. See discussion supra Part (I)(B)(iii).
272. United States v. Smith, 964 F. Supp. 286, 294 (N.D. Iowa 1997), a'ffd, 171 F.3d
617 (8th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
273. United States v. Ficke, 58 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (D. Neb. 1999); supra notes 107 -
112 and accompanying text.
274. See discussion supra notes 163-165 and accompanying text.
275. Id.
276. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(i)(II)(bb); United States v. Akins, 243 F.3d 1199
(9th Cir. 2001).
277. See discussion supra Part (V)(A)-(B).
278. Id.
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